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ations for upholding Parden far outweighed the arguments for departure
from its original interpretation ofFELA
in 1964. Id. at 564.
The Court interpreted the fact that
Congress had not taken any action to
alter the Court's decision in the 28
years since Parden was decided as
meaning that the legislative branch
was in agreement with the holding. Id.
The Court also recognized that many
States had acted in reliance upon FELA
in drafting their workers' compensation statutes, so that overruling Parden
would require an extensive legislative
response to provide coverage to railroad workers. Id. Most importantly,
the Court noted that overruling Parden
would strip all FELA protection from
state-employed workers, leaving the
plaintiffin this case, Hilton, without a
forum to redress his work related injury.Id.
In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the
majority's overriding concern to leave
Hilton a forum to redress his injuries
caused the majority to misapply the
Court's previous decisions, which
would have clearly overruled the holding of Parden. Id. at 566, 570. The
dissent found no distinction to be made
between a federal or state forum when
a plaintiffbrought suit under a federal
statute. In both situations, the "clear
statement" rule enunciated in Will
should have been applied. Id. at 567.
Thus, based on the holding of Welch,
that FELA did not contain a clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate State immunity, Justice O'Connor
argued that the Court should overturn
the remedial provisions of FELA and
affirm the state courts' decision in
Hilton. Id. As a result, O'Connor concluded that state legislatures would be
compelled to redraft statutes which
excluded railroad workers from coverage, in order to provide an alternative
remedy, and the plaintiff in this case
would be denied a remedy in a court of
law. Id. at 570.
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public
Railways Commission, the Supreme
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Court held that FELA created a cause
ofaction against state-owned railroads
to be enforced in state courts only. The
Court's decision left state-employed
railroad workers with a forum of recourse to redress work-related injuries.
It also avoided the possibility of requiring an extensive legislative redrafting of many state workers' compensation statutes, which exclude these workers from coverage because of the drafters' reliance upon previous Supreme
Court decisions.
- Linda M Googins
Willy v. Coastal Corp.: RULE 11
SANCTIONS UPHELD ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WAS SUBSEQUENTL Y FOUND TO LACK
JURISDICTION.
In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S.
Ct. 1076 (1992), a unanimous Court
concluded that Article III ofthe United
States Constitution was not violated
when a federal district court that lacked
subject matter jurisdiction imposed
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Those sanctions were of a collateral
concern to the case because the sanctioned behavior was unrelated to
Donald J. Willy's effort to convince
the federal district court that it lacked
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court
determined that it did not raise the
issue ofa district court adjudicating the
merits of a "case or controversy" over
which it lacked jurisdiction.
Willy filed suit against Coastal Corporation ("Coastal") after he was discharged as in-house counsel. Willy
alleged that Coastal violated state and
federal environmental laws and that
Coastal tenninated his employment due
to his refusal to participate in these
alleged transgressions. Willy asserted
that the termination ofhis employment
by Coastal violated state and federal
laws, including ''whistleblower'' provisions.
Although Willy sued in Texas state
court, Coastal claimed that there was
original federal question jurisdiction

under Title 28, sections 1331 and 1441
of the United States Code. The case
was subsequently removed to federal
district court. Despite Willy's objections, the district court concluded that
it had subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court granted Coastal's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
and the court also dismissed the pendent state claims made by Willy. In
addition, the district court allowed
Coastal's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The court awarded Coastal
attorney's fees against Willy and his
attorney, jointly and severally.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court order
that dismissed Willy's claims and remanded the case to state court. It
concluded that the complaint did not
raise claims arising under federal law,
and thus, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court of
appeals, however, upheld the Rule 11
sanctions imposed by the district court,
and on remand the district court was
ordered to determine the appropriate
amount of attorneys' fees to be recovered by Coastal.
On the second appeal, the court
affirmed the district court's reassessment of the amount of attorney's fees
to be paid by Willy and his attorney.
The court of appeals also rejected
Willy's objection that the district court
did not have constitutional authority to
impose Rule 11 sanctions when it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
at 1078. The court stated that Rule 11
sanctions were within the inherent powers of all federal courts, and therefore,
the district court had appropriately exercised this power.
The United States Supreme Court
agreed with Willy's argument that in
the Rules Enabling Act and in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
"implicit premise ... [is] that rules of
practice and procedure are not necessary of disputes beyond the judicial
power conferred by Article III." [d. at
1078-79 (quoting Brief for Petitioner
at 28). Notwithstanding that premise,
the Court responded that this does not

resolve the case at hand. In Sibbach v.
Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court
"observed that federal courts, in adopting rules were not free to extend or
restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a
statute." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1079.
Federal courts, therefore, cannot adopt
rules which modify the judicial power
granted by Article III of the United
States Constitution.
Willy argued that the district court
had overreached the judicial power
granted by Article III by imposing
Rule 11 sanctions in a case absent
subject matter jurisdiction. ''Thus,
according to petitioner, even had Congress attempted to grant the courts
authority to impose sanctions in a case
such as this, the grant would run afoul
of Article IlL" Willy, 112 S. Ct. at
1079. Willy conceded that there are
circumstances in which federal courts
without subject matterjurisdiction may
impose sanctions. Nevertheless, he
contended that federal courts may not
take such action "against a party who
has successfully contestedjurisdiction."
Id. at 1079. The Court, however, reasoned that "in acknowledging the many
circumstances in which sanctions can
be imposed, several which have a statutory basis, petitioner effectively concedes both Congress' general power to
regulate the courts and its specific
power to authorize the imposition of
sanctions." Id. at 1080.
The Court stated that a federal court
found lacking subject matter jurisdiction would be precluded from further
adjudication of the case; ''but such a
determination does not automatically
wipe out all proceedings had in the
district court at a time when the district
court operated under the misapprehension that it hadjurisdiction." Id. After
reviewing other cases, the Court declared that in the interest of maintaining orderly procedure, sanctions should
be upheld despite a later determination
that the federal court was without jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, Rule 11
sanctions were of collateral concern
and such sanctions were not an assessment of the legal merits of a case. Id.

Relying on Cooter & Gellv. Hartmarx the investigators in the criminal matCorp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the Court ter. In Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677
state that "it is well established that a (Md. 1992), the court of appeals held a
federal court may consider collateral private investigator's testimony about
issues after an action is no longer pend- statements made by the defendant being." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1080 (quot- fore her attorney arrived at the murder
ing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. 384).
scene did not violate attorney-client
Willy supported his claim by citing privilege. However, the court found
United States Catholic Conference v. that the investigator's testimony conAbortion Rights Mobilization. Inc., 487 cerning events occurring later violated
U.S. 72 (1988), in which the Court her attorney-client privilege, but was
concluded that if on remand, the dis- harmless error. The court, although
trict court is found to be deficient in not explicitly doing so, appeared to
subject matter jurisdiction, the con- adopt an exception to the attorneytempt orders enacted by the district client privilege for evidence removed
court must collapse. Willy, 112 S. Ct. or altered by defense counsel.
at 1089. Based on this decision, Willy
Lisa Rubin and Timothy Warner's
asserted that Rule 11 sanctions im- 1O-year marriage was turbulent. It was
posed by a district court without sub- marked by numerous affairs and the
ject matter jurisdiction must fall. The alleged attempted murder of Rubin's
Court rejected Willy's liberal applica- ex-lover. In March 1990, Warner
tion of Catholic Conference the and moved out ofthe couple's home. Sevemphasized the differences in the pur- eral days later, Rubin engaged the serpose ofacivil contempt order and Rule vices of Prudential Associates, Inc., a
11 sanctions.
private investigating agency, to prove
Since Rule 11 sanctions do not in- that Warner was committing adultery.
volve the merits of a "case or contro- During the course of the investigation,
versy," a federal court without subject Rubin developed a close relationship
matter jurisdiction over a case may with Robert Miller, Prudential's presiconstitutionally impose procedural dent, and told Miller that Warner had
rules which are collateral to the case at admitted to her that he had tried to kill
hand. Accordingly, parties must ob- her former lover. Millerrecommended
serve procedural rules, such as Rule that Rubin consult with Prudential's
11, when practicing before federal attorney, Darrel Longest, about a poscourts, whether or not they agree with sible accessoryship problem. Rubin
the jurisdiction of that court.
subsequently met with Longest and
retained him to represent her.
On April 23, 1990, Warner tele- Carol Nakhuda Cohen
phoned Rubin concerning their dog.
Rubin v. State: PROTECTION OF They agreed to meet at the
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI- veterinarian's office the following
LEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO LO- evening. After meeting at a parking
CATION AND CONDITION OF lot, Rubin and Warner walked down a
TANGIBLE EVIDENCE RE- path through a wooded area. There,
MOVED OR ALTERED BY DE- Rubin shot Warner nine times with a
FENSE COUNSEL EVEN IF IT IM- .38 caliber pistol, reloading twice in
the process. Rubin then called Miller
PLICATES THE DEFENDANT.
In a six to one decision, the Court of and arranged to meet him, without
Appeals of Maryland held that state- telling him the purpose ofthe meeting.
ments made by a defendant in a crimi- Miller, along with an associate,
nal case to investigators she had hired Leopold, met Rubin and she subsein a related domestic matter were not quently led them to the murder site.
protected by attorney-client privilege Only after talking to Rubin and examuntil her attorney specifically retained ining the scene did Miller call attorney
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